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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 18-1337 
_____________ 
  
MOHAMED SAMBARE, 
Petitioner 
     
v. 
  
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
      Respondent 
______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A058-305-898) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Kuyomars Golparvar 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a): 
March 8, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before:  AMBRO, RESTREPO, GREENBERG, 
Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  May 28, 2019) 
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Raymond G. Lahoud 
Norris McLaughlin & Marcus 
515 West Hamilton Street 
Suite 502 
Allentown, PA 18101 
Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Erik R. Quick 
Marina Carin Stevenson 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
450 5th Street, N.W. 
P.O. Box 878 
Washington, DC 20001 
 Counsel for Respondent 
  
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Petitioner Mohamed Sambare seeks review of the 
decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which 
dismissed his appeal of an order of removal entered by the 
Immigration Court.  In particular, Sambare asserts that the BIA 
erred in finding that his conviction under Pennsylvania’s 
statute criminalizing driving under the influence of a controlled 
substance, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802(d)(1)(i) (“Pennsylvania 
DUI Statute”), constituted a conviction for a “violation of . . . 
any law or regulation of a State . . . relating to a controlled 
substance . . . , other than a single offense involving possession 
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for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana” pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  We disagree, and thus we will 
deny the Petition. 
I. 
 Sambare is a thirty-one-year-old native of Côte d’Ivoire 
and a citizen of Burkina Faso.  In 2006, Sambare was admitted 
to the United States as a lawful permanent resident.  In the 
years following his admission to the United States, Sambare 
was convicted of various crimes, including credit card theft and 
forgery.  In connection with these convictions, U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) initiated 
removal proceedings in August 2013, when Sambare returned 
to the United States from Ghana, where he was visiting his 
mother.  ICE asserted that Sambare was inadmissible pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), insofar as it alleged that 
Sambare previously had been convicted of “crime[s] involving 
moral turpitude.”  In October 2013, however, an Immigration 
Court granted Sambare’s application for a waiver of 
inadmissibility pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) and thus 
restored his status as a lawful permanent resident. 
  In September 2015, police in York County, 
Pennsylvania, stopped Sambare in his vehicle after he 
allegedly made an illegal U-turn.  During the traffic stop, the 
officer informed Sambare that he detected the scent of 
marijuana, and Sambare—who at one point provided a false 
name to the officer—admitted that he had smoked marijuana 
prior to operating the vehicle.  Pursuant to a subsequent drug 
screening, Sambare tested positive for marijuana in his system.  
The Commonwealth charged Sambare with, among other 
crimes, driving under the influence of a Schedule I controlled 
substance, in violation of the Pennsylvania DUI Statute.  In 
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April 2016, Sambare pleaded guilty to violating the 
Pennsylvania DUI Statute. 
 As a result of Sambare’s conviction for violating the 
Pennsylvania DUI Statute, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security initiated removal proceedings, asserting that 
Sambare’s conviction was for a “violation of . . . any law or 
regulation of a State . . . relating to a controlled substance . . . , 
other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own 
use of 30 grams or less of marijuana” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  The Immigration Court found that 
Sambare was removable, concluding that his violation of the 
Pennsylvania DUI Statute “is a completely different type of 
offense involving being under the influence of marijuana and 
. . . fall[s] outside of the exception” for possession of thirty 
grams or less of marijuana for personal use.1  App. 18A.  On 
appeal, the BIA “disagree[d] with [Sambare]’s argument that 
his controlled substance conviction falls within the scope of the 
‘possession for personal use’ exception in [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)]” and concluded that his “conviction 
                                              
1  The Immigration Court also denied Sambare’s 
application for asylum and withholding of removal under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 and withholding and 
deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention 
Against Torture.  On appeal, Sambare only challenged the 
Immigration Court’s decision with respect to the Pennsylvania 
DUI Statute.  Because the sole issue before us is whether 
Sambare’s conviction under the Pennsylvania DUI Statute falls 
within the “possession for personal use” exception under 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), we only have included the details 
of the Immigration Court’s decision insofar as they relate to 
this issue. 
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encompasses more than simply ingesting marijuana for 
personal use.”  Id. at 8A.  The BIA reasoned that Sambare’s 
conviction “is associated with the prohibition of driving, 
operating, or actual physical control of the movement of a 
vehicle . . . while there is a controlled substance in the 
individual’s blood” and that such a conviction “is more serious 
than simple possession.”  Id.  The BIA thus dismissed 
Sambare’s appeal, and he petitions this Court for review of the 
BIA’s decision. 
II. 
 The BIA exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3), 1240.15.  The Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1965 places restrictions on the jurisdiction of our Court 
to review final orders of removal.  As relevant to this case, the 
Act restricts our jurisdiction “to review any final order of 
removal against an alien who is removable by reason of having 
committed a criminal offense covered in section . . . 
1227(a)(2)[](B),” which relates to controlled substances.  
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).  We retain jurisdiction, however, “to 
determine whether the necessary jurisdiction-stripping facts 
are present in a particular case, specifically . . . whether [an 
alien] has been convicted of one of the enumerated offenses.” 
Borrome v. Attorney Gen., 687 F.3d 150, 154 (3d Cir. 2012).  
Thus, subject to the principles of deference espoused in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
467 U.S. 837 (1984), we review de novo the BIA’s legal 
determination that Sambare’s conviction under the 
Pennsylvania DUI Statute constituted a conviction for a 
“violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . . relating to 
a controlled substance . . . , other than a single offense 
involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
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marijuana” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).2  See 
Denis v. Attorney Gen., 633 F.3d 201, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 The sole issue in this case is whether the Court can 
interpret the word “involving” in such a broad manner so as to 
construe Sambare’s conviction for violating Pennsylvania’s 
DUI Statute as a conviction for “a single offense involving 
possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of marijuana,” 
the effect of which would be to enable Sambare to avail himself 
of the “possession for personal use” exception to removability 
contained in  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Sambare urges us to 
analyze this issue by applying the categorical approach, which 
is “a method often used to ascertain whether a prior conviction 
‘fits’ the definition of a generic federal predicate offense for 
purposes of certain immigration or sentencing consequences.”  
Rojas v. Attorney Gen., 728 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc).  Under the categorical approach, a court “determine[s] 
only whether a conviction under [a] state statute ‘necessarily’ 
contained all of the elements of the [relevant] federal baseline 
offense.”  Id.  To make such a determination, a court 
“compar[es] the elements of the state and federal crimes,” 
rather than “delv[ing] into the particular facts of a conviction[,] 
to ascertain if there is a proper fit.”  Id. at 214–15. 
 The categorical approach, however, is inapplicable 
here.  We previously have refused to apply the categorical or 
                                              
2   We need not decide whether we should accord 
deference under Chevron to the BIA’s legal determinations 
because, even applying a de novo standard, we would deny 
Sambare’s Petition.  
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“modified categorical”3 approach to determine whether a state 
conviction “relate[d] to a controlled substance” under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), see id. at 215 (emphasis added), and we 
now similarly refuse to apply the categorical or modified 
categorical approach to determine whether Sambare’s 
conviction “involve[s] possession for one’s own use of 30 
grams or less of marijuana,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  This 
is not a case in which the Court “must compare the defendant’s 
or the noncitizen’s conviction to a ‘generic crime’ such as 
‘burglary’ or ‘theft,’” a task for which application of the 
categorical approach would be appropriate.  Rojas, 728 F.3d at 
215.  Rather, we are presented with the quite specific “crime” 
of “a single offense involving possession for one’s own use of 
30 grams or less of marijuana,” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) 
(emphasis added), and thus it is proper for us to consider 
simply “the text of the law,” Rojas, 728 F.3d at 216. 
 “In cases of statutory interpretation, ‘we begin by 
looking at the terms of the provisions [at issue] and the 
commonsense conception of those terms.’” Rojas, 728 F.3d at 
208 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 573 
                                              
3  The modified categorical approach “permits a slight 
deviation . . . from the baseline rule that an inquiring court may 
not look into the particular circumstances of a conviction.”  
Rojas, 728 F.3d at 215.  If a “statute of conviction lists 
elements in the alternative, some of which fit the federal 
definition and some of which do not,” under the modified 
categorical approach, “a court is permitted ‘to consult a limited 
class of documents . . . to determine which alternative formed 
the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.’”  Id. (quoting 
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013)). 
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(2010)).  The “commonsense conception” of the phrase 
“possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana” is that Congress was referring to the crime of 
“simple possession” of a small amount of marijuana, 
exempting from the harsh immigration consequence of 
removal those convicted of a misdemeanor drug crime that is 
only punishable in Pennsylvania, for example, by thirty days’ 
imprisonment and/or a $500 fine.  See 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-
113(g); see also In re Moncada-Servellon, 24 I. & N. Dec. 62, 
65 (2007) (“[T]he most natural, common-sense reading of the 
personal-use exception, viewed in its statutory context, is that 
it is directed at ameliorating the potentially harsh immigration 
consequences of the least serious drug violations only—that is, 
those involving the simple possession of small amounts of 
marijuana.”).  In this case, however, Sambare was not 
convicted of simple possession of a small amount of 
marijuana—he was convicted of operating a vehicle under the 
influence of marijuana in violation of the Pennsylvania DUI 
Statute, which undoubtedly is a more serious offense than 
simple possession.  The touchstone of laws prohibiting simple 
possession of marijuana (and the relaxed penalties associated 
with such laws) is that any consequences of such possession of 
marijuana are normally personal to the possessor and do not 
affect a wide population of people in any immediate way.  See, 
e.g., 35 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 780-113(a)(31) (prohibiting 
“possession of a small amount of mari[j]uana only for personal 
use” and the distribution of a small amount of marijuana for a 
purpose other than sale (emphasis added)).  In contrast, 
Sambare’s crime of conviction—violation of the Pennsylvania 
DUI Statute—is intended to protect the general public on our 
roads and highways from persons whose ability to operate a 
vehicle may be impaired due to the effects of, among other 
things, marijuana use.  See Commonwealth v. Griffith, 32 A.3d 
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1231, 1238 (Pa. 2011) (holding that the “statutory framework 
with regard to prohibitions against driving after drug usage” is 
similar to that with respect to driving after consuming alcohol, 
the “focus of [which] remains on the inability of the individual 
to drive safely” (emphasis added)).  Therefore, Sambare’s 
conviction under the Pennsylvania DUI Statute for driving 
under the influence of marijuana, to which he pleaded guilty, 
is a more serious crime than simple possession of a small 
amount of marijuana, and we decline to interpret the word 
“involving” in such a broad way so as to construe a conviction 
under the Pennsylvania DUI Statute as a “a single offense 
involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  See Moncada-
Servellon, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 65 (“The personal-use exception 
is not intended or understood by Congress to apply to offenses 
that are significantly more serious than simple possession by 
virtue of other statutory elements that greatly increase their 
severity.”). 
III. 
 Therefore, Sambare’s conviction for a violation of the 
Pennsylvania DUI Statute constituted a conviction for a 
“violation of . . . any law or regulation of a State . . . relating to 
a controlled substance . . . , other than a single offense 
involving possession for one’s own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana” pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  
Accordingly, we will deny Sambare’s Petition because we lack 
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). 
